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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Larry Eugene Morris appeals from the district court's order granting his
Rule 35 motion for leniency and modifying his sentence and his motion for
commutation of sentence pursuant to Rule 33(d).

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The district court in its memorandum decision and order denying Morris'
motion for commutation of sentence described the facts and the proceedings in
Morris' underlying criminal case as follows:
The State of Idaho (State) filed an Information on June 24,
2010, accusing Larry Eugene Morris (Morris) with [sic] the crimes of
Possession of a Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine),
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Resisting and/or
Obstructing Law Enforcement. The State also alleged a Part II
Habitual Offender sentence enhancement provision.
On July 23, 2010, Morris plead [sic] guilty to the Possession
of Methamphetamine charge, and admitted the Habitual Offender
provision. The State agreed to move for dismissal of the remaining
charges, and Morris agreed that he waived his right to appeal the
Court's sentence. The parties agreed to jointly recommend a ten
(10) year unified sentence, consisting of five (5) years fixed
followed by five (5) years indeterminate. The Court was not asked
to be bound by this joint recommendation, and the State further
agreed it would recommend suspension of the sentence and
probation if Morris cooperated with law enforcement investigations
prior to sentencing.
Morris was also released on his own
recognizance.
Sentencing was held on November 29, 2010.
It was
determined that Morris had not complied with the expectations of
assisting law enforcement prior to sentencing. Morris's explanation
was that he could not comply with law enforcement requests that
would endanger a plan for Morris and his wife to regain custody of
their child pursuant to a Child Protection Action.
The Court
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sentenced Morris to a ten (10) year unified sentence, with the first
five (5) years fixed.
The Judgment, filed November 30, 2010, notified Morris of
his right to appeal the sentence, notwithstanding his plea
agreement to waive his right of appeal.
Morris filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence pursuant to
I.C.R. 35, on the basis of a plea for leniency. A hearing on this
Motion was held February 8, 2011, and Morris appeared and
testified telephonically. The Court exercised its discretion and
modified Morris's sentence so that it remained a ten (10) year
unified sentence, but consisting of four (4) years fixed followed by
six (6) years indeterminate.
Morris filed his Notice of Appeal on March 18, 2011,
appealing the Order Granting Rule 35 Motion and Modifying
Sentence; on May 18, 2011, Morris, on his own, filed a Motion for
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, I.C.R. 35. The Motion
alleged an illegal sentence. Counsel for Morris filed a Motion for
Commutation of Sentence, Suspension of Execution of Judgment
and Placement on Supervised Probation on September 1, 2011.
This Motion seemed to replace the "illegal sentence" motion that
Morris had filed on May 18, 2011. The Motion for Commutation
was filed pursuant to I.C.R. 33(d).
Morris was again allowed to appear and testify telephonically
at the hearing on his Motion for Commutation held on October 21,
2011, and Morris also presented other evidence in support of his
Motion. The Court allowed the parties to submit further briefing on
the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction to commute the
sentence under these circumstances. At the conclusion of that
briefing, the Court took the matter under advisement on November
4, 2011.
(Supp.

R.

pp.106-108., 1)

The district court denied Morris' motion for

commutation having found it was without jurisdiction to grant such relief under
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Two separate clerk's records have been compiled in this case. The first, being
prepared and certified following the initial notice of appeal from the denial of
Morris' Rule 35 motion, will be referred to in the state's brief as "R." The
subsequent court record, certified on January 2ih, 2012, after the notice of
appeal from the district court's denial of Morris' Rule 33(d) motion, will be cited
as "Supp. R.,"
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Rule 33(d). (Supp. R., p.110.) The court further found even if it had jurisdiction
to commute the sentence, Morris' record before it did "not support probation or a
commuted sentence." (Supp. R., p.109.)
Morris timely appealed. (R., pp.100-101, 102-105; Supp. R., pp.106-111,
185-188.)
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ISSUES
Morris states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to commute Mr. Morris' sentence
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(3) and Idaho Code Section 192601 (4 )?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris's
request for probation, made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Morris'
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(d) motion on its merits?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Morris failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
granting his Rule 35 motion?
2. Has Morris failed to show the district court had jurisdiction to consider a
motion for commutation of sentence subsequent to his sentencing and the
transfer of his jurisdiction to the department of corrections?
3. Has Morris failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for commutation pursuant to Rule 33(d) on the merits?
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ARGUMENTS

I.
Morris Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Granting His Rule 35 Motion For Leniency And Modifying Morris' Sentence By
Reducing The Fixed Portion By One Year And Failing To Grant Probation
A.

Introduction
Morris argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in

denying his request for probation pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (Appellant's brief, pp.1116.) Specifically, Morris argues there was "additional information present [sic] at
sentencing which, when viewed in light of Mr. Morris' new information, supports
either placement on probation or a reduction of his sentence." (Appellant's brief,
p.14.)

Morris has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. A review of the

record supports the district court's determination, in light of his extension criminal
history, that Morris was not an appropriate candidate for probation, and Morris
failed to present any new evidence entitling him to a further reduction of his
underlying sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and the Court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203,
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Morris must "show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." l!;t
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C.

Morris Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Ruling On His Rule 35 Motion Requesting Leniency In His Sentence
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at
840. Morris did not appeal his underlying sentence. Therefore, to prevail on his
claim that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion,
Morris must "show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion."

JJ:L;

also State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442

(2008) (absent the presentation of new evidence, an appeal from the denial of a
Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence).
Morris has failed to satisfy his burden.
In considering Morris' request for reduction of his sentence pursuant to
Rule 35, the district court noted it had learned of one factor it was unaware of at
the time of sentencing:

"that Mr. Morris had provided information to law

enforcement regarding [unrelated] robbery charges before his arrest in this
matter." (2/8/11 Tr., p.101, Ls.11-15.) The court believed this information to be
important because the state's negotiated recommendation for probation was
contingent upon Morris' cooperation with law enforcement subsequent to his
arrest for the current charges; the court reconsidered its "assessment that
[Morris] just never intended to work for the Task Forces as he had made an
agreement." (See 2/8/11 Tr., p.101, L.15 - p.102, L.8.) However, this new piece
of information did not override the court's concerns to the point it believed Morris
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was an appropriate candidate for probation. After considering this new factor,
weighed against the previously evaluated aggravating circumstances of Morris'
situation, the district court did grant his Rule 35 motion in part by reducing the
fixed portion to be served by one year, but denying Morris' continued request for
probation:
I'm going to modify the sentence in this case because it's
hard to look back at a sentencing and say had I heard back at the
sentencing date about Mr. Morris having provided information to
the police, not in exchange for money or in a deal to get some
lenient treatment on his own sentence but just because he had
some information and wanted to give it to police, it's hard to know
what sentence I would have given at that time. I firmly believe that
the sentence would have been a prison sentence. Mr. Morris'
record, the facts leading up to that, Mr. Morris' possession of meth
charge and conviction, and the fact that he's a habitual offender
means that probation was simply not in the cards for Mr. Morris.
It's not in the cards today. It would be diminishing his criminal
history. It would be diminishing the crime. It would not act as
appropriate punishment at all. It would not act as appropriate
deterrence to Mr. Morris or to any other person.
(2/8/11 Tr., p.103, L.9 - p.104, L.1.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined that Morris failed to show through his new piece of information that
he was a candidate for probation. Morris has failed to establish that the district
court abused its discretion in denying his request pursuant to Rule 35 to be
placed on probation.
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l I.
The District Court Correctly Determined It Was Without Jurisdiction To Consider
Morris' Motion For Commutation Of His Sentence Following The Imposition Of
His Sentence And Transfer Of Jurisdiction To The Department Of Corrections

A

Introduction
Morris asserts on appeal the district court erred in concluding it was

without jurisdiction to commute Morris' sentence pursuant to Rule 33(d).
Specifically, Morris argues the district court had jurisdiction to do so pursuant to
Rule 33(d) when read in conjunction with Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4). (Appellant's
brief, pp.5-10.) Morris' argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P .3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405,
94 P.3d 709,710 (Ct. App. 2004).
'"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when
brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering. Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.
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C.

The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Rule On Morris' Request
For Commutation Of His Sentence
Idaho Criminal Rule 33 governs the timing for the imposition of a sentence

following a conviction:
[a]fter a plea or a verdict of guilty, if the judgment be not arrested
nor a new trial granted, the court must appoint a time for
pronouncing judgment and sentence, which, in cases of felony,
must, unless waived by the defendant, be at least two (2) days
after the verdict.
I.C.R. 33(a)(1 ).

The Rule further provides the conditions required for the

pronouncement of a sentence other than imposition:
For an offense not punishable by death, the district court or the
magistrates division may commute the sentence, suspend the
execution of the judgment, or withhold judgment, and place the
defendant upon probation as provided by law and these rules.
I.C.R. 33(d). Subsequent to the granting of his Rule 35 motion and the reduction
of the fixed portion of his sentence by one year, Morris moved the district court
pursuant to Rule 33 to commute his sentence and place him on probation,
relying on generally the same information presented to the court in his previously
litigated Rule 35 motion.

2

The district court correctly denied the motion for

commutation of sentence, finding "the rule and statute outline options for
sentencing and seem applicable only at the time of sentencing."

(Supp.R.,

p.108.)

2

In fact, the filing of Morris' Rule 33 motion for commutation of his sentence was
preceded by and ultimately supported with Morris' prose Rule 35 motion for the
correction of an illegal sentence filed subsequent to the district court's granting of
the Rule 35 motion for leniency. (Supp. R., pp.19-27.)
9

The Court of Appeals has previously addressed the issue of a petition to
commute a sentence to probation filed from prison pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 in
State v. Starry, 130 Idaho 834, 835, 948 P.2d 1133, 1134 (Ct. App. 1997)
(citations omitted):
As a preliminary matter, we clarify the nature of Starry's
petition. He characterizes it as a request for commutation of his
sentence.
However, the district court has no authority to
"commute" a sentence once it has been imposed and executed.
Such authority is vested in the executive branch through the Board
of Pardons, acting as the Commission of Pardons and Parole. In
his petition, Starry requests that he be placed on probation in lieu
of serving the remainder of his sentence in prison so that he may
obtain meaningful rehabilitation for his substance abuse problems.
In addition, he suggests that because this was his first violent
offense, he is amenable to rehabilitation and should be given an
opportunity to become a productive member of society. Because
Starry essentially requests a reduction of sentence, his petition is
more accurately characterized as a motion falling under I.C.R. 35.
The facts in Morris' case are analogous. Morris was granted a reduction of the
fixed portion of his sentence pursuant to a motion for leniency filed under I.C.R.
35. Morris essentially filed a second Rule 35 motion requesting further leniency
by placing him on probation.

As in Starry, the district court was without

jurisdiction to consider this untimely motion for leniency filed some nine months
following the filing of Morris' judgment of conviction on November 30, 2010. (R.,
pp.76-78; Supp. R., pp.19-20.) Starry, 130 Idaho at 835, 948 P.2d at 1134. ("A
trial court has jurisdiction to reduce a lawful sentence within 120 days after the
filing of a judgment of conviction.")
The district court correctly determined it was without jurisdiction to
consider Morris' motion for commutation of sentence following his original
sentencing hearing and the resolution of his Rule 35 plea for leniency.
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111.
Had The District Court Possessed The Jurisdiction To Rule On Morris' Motion To
Commute His Sentence, Morris Has Failed To Carry His Appellate Burden In
Establishing The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining Morris'
Presentation To The Court Did Not Warrant Such A Request
In denying Morris' plea for commutation of his sentence pursuant to Rule
33, the district court analyzed Morris' circumstances as it had when presented
with Morris' Rule 35 request for leniency:
Even if this Court was possessed of jurisdiction to commute
the sentence, it would not exercise its discretion (if it had any) to do
so.
The over-all record before this Court does not support
probation or a commuted sentence. Such an action would not be
appropriate to adequately protect society or deter Mr. Morris or
others similarly situated. A suspended or commuted sentence
would seriously depreciate the long and harmful criminal history of
record. Any rehabilitation efforts for Mr. Morris are best addressed
from within a secured facility until the parole board deems
otherwise.
(Supp. R., pp.109-110.) As discussed in Section I of the state's brief, Morris has
failed to carry his burden in establishing the district court erred in denying his
request for probation.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the orders granting
Morris' Rule 35 motion and modifying sentence and denying Morris' motion for
commutation of sentence pursuant to Rule 33(d).
DATED this 16th day of August 2 ~ -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 16 day of August 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in th
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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